

- (4) Interfering or endeavoring to interfere with the conduct of investigations by the Department of Justice of the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force.

Some of the specifics supporting the above paragraph of Article I are the following:

Specifically, on June 21, 1972 Ehrlichman told Gray that Dean would be handling an inquiry into Watergate for the White House. Specifically, on June 21, 1972 Dean told Gray that he would sit in on FBI interviews of White House personnel. (Book II, 314) Specifically, on June 22, 1972 Gray informed Dean that the \$100 bills found on the Watergate burglars had been traced to Bernard Barker's Miami bank account and that Dahlberg and Ogarrion had been identified as the makers of the checks. (Book II, 339, 2 SSC 576-77) Specifically, on June 23 Dean reported this information to Haldeman. (Book II, 356) Specifically, on June 23, 1972 the President directed Haldeman and Ehrlichman to meet with Helms and Walters and express White House concerns and ask Walters to meet with Gray and communicate those concerns to him. (Book II, 359)

Specifically, on June 28, 1972 Ehrlichman instructed Gray to cancel a meeting he had scheduled for later that day with Helms and Walters. The meeting had been arranged to resolve the question of CIA interest, if any, in the FBI's Watergate investigation. (Book II, 454)

Specifically, on June 28, 1972 Gray directed that the FBI interview Ogarrio and continue its efforts to locate Dahlberg. (Book II, 473-75)

Specifically, on June 28, 1972, Dean asked Walters if the CIA could stop the FBI investigation of Dahlberg and Ogarrio. (Book II, 434)

Specifically, on June 28, 1972 Dean telephoned Gray and urged that, for national security reasons or because of CIA interest, efforts to interview Ogarrio and Dahlberg be held up. Specifically, on June 29, 1972, Gray cancelled the interviews. (Book II, 473-75)

Specifically, in July, 1972 Dean obtained from Gray raw data on the FBI's Watergate investigation and showed these FBI reports to the attorneys for CRP and to CRP officials. (Book II, 555-560)

Specifically, prior to Gray supplying Dean with FBI data, Dean had made a similar request to Kleindienst but Kleindienst had refused to make the documents available to Dean. (Book II, 560)

Specifically, in early August, 1972 the President assigned Ehrlichman to see that Stans not be required to testify before the Grand Jury (Book II, 567). Specifically, in July, 1972 Ehrlichman instructed Dean to make arrangements with Petersen to take Stans' deposition outside the Grand Jury. Specifically, Dean and then Ehrlichman contacted Petersen, but both were unsuccessful. Next, Ehrlichman telephoned Kleindienst. Kleindienst warned Ehrlichman that he was lucky Petersen had not made an obstruction of justice complaint. (Book II, 3564-65) Specifically, in August, 1972 Petersen agreed to take the deposition by Stans in his office, in lieu of his scheduled Grand Jury appearance. (Book II, 565, 567-69, 571)

Specifically, in July and August, 1972, Dean had made arrangements for Colson, Krogh, Young, Chapin and Strachan to offer testimony before the prosecutors instead of the Grand Jury. (Book II, 565)

Specifically, on April 17, 1973 the President told Haldeman that "Dean is trying to tell enough to get immunity and that is frankly what it is Bob." Haldeman responded, "That is the real problem we've got. . . ." (WHT 986-88) Specifically, on April 17, 1973, the President told Petersen that any immunity grant to Dean would be interpreted as a deal by Petersen to cancel the fact that Petersen had provided Dean with Grand Jury information in 1972. Specifically, on April 17, 1972 Petersen told the President of his objection to the inclusion of a reference in the President's public statement approving grants of immunity. Specifically, on April 19, 1972, the President told Haldeman's and Ehrlichman's attorneys, Wilson and Strickler, that Dean was a "loose cannon," and indicated to them that he had put out his April 17 statement on immunity because the prosecutors were hung up on the question of giving immunity to Dean. (WHT 1239)

- (1) Making false or misleading statements to
lawfully authorized investigative officers
and employees of the United States
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1. On June 22, 1972 the President publicly stated that John Mitchell had accurately stated the facts of Watergate. On June 20, 1972 Mitchell had stated that CRP had no legal, moral or ethical responsibility for the Watergate break-in. On July 5, 1972 John Mitchell when interviewed by the FBI denied knowledge of any information relating to the break-in. (Summary 32-33, 45)

2. On March 13, 1973 Dean told the President that Strachan had twice given false or misleading statements to the FBI relating to his prior knowledge of Watergate. (Summary 103)

3. On March 27, 1973 the President instructed Ehrlichman to meet with Attorney-General Kleindienst and tell him that "Dean was not involved -- had no prior knowledge"; that neither Haldezan, Ehrlichman, or Colson had prior knowledge, but that there was serious question being raised about Mitchell. (Summary 128-29) On the following day, Ehrlichman telephoned Kleindienst and executed the President's instructions. He relayed the President's assurance that there was no White House involvement in the break-in, but said serious questions were being raised with regard to Mitchell. (Summary of Information 129-130) When Ehrlichman relayed to Kleindienst what he termed the "best information that the President had or has . . ." he did not disclose the information the President had received on March 21, 1973 from Dean, nor was he instructed by the President to do so. (Summary of Information, 130)

4. On April 27, 1973 the President gave false or misleading information to Petersen concerning the substance of his March 21, 1973 conversation with Dean, in that he stated that he had totally turned off the payment to Hunt. This conversation occurred after Haldeman had listened to the tape of the March 21 conversation, made notes, and reported to the President. (Summary, 157-159, 166)

5. On June 16, 1973 J. Fred Buzhardt, at the direction of the President, gave Special Prosecutor Cox false and misleading information concerning a tape recording of a conversation between the President and Dean on April 15, 1973, in that he failed to disclose the existence of the White House taping system. (Summary, 163)

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(2) Withholding relevant and material evidence or information from lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States

1. On March 22, 1973, the President telephoned Attorney General Kleindienst during the course of a meeting with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Dean. The President did not disclose during this call the information he had received on the previous day from Dean as to the complicity of his associates in the Watergate break-in and its cover-up, or any other relevant and material information he possessed. Instead, the President acted to implement a previous decision and instructed Kleindienst to begin working with Senator Baker for the President's positions with respect to the upcoming hearings of the Senate Select Committee. (Summary 127)

2. On March 23, 1973 and March 25, 1973, the President spoke by telephone with Attorney-General Kleindienst. The President did not disclose any of the relevant and material information he possessed with respect to the Watergate matter to the Attorney-General during the course of these conversations. (Summary 127)

3. On March 23, 1973 the President telephoned Acting Director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray. The President told Gray that he was aware of the beating Gray had taken during his confirmation hearings and he believed it to be unfair. He also reminded Gray that he had told Gray to conduct a "thorough and aggressive investigation". Although at this time the FBI was still investigating the Watergate matter, the President did not tell Gray of the information he had received from Dean on March 21, 1973, or of any other relevant and material information he possessed.

(Summary of Information, 127)

4. On April 15, 1973 the President met with Attorney-General Kleindienst who reported to the President that the prosecutors had evidence implicating Mitchell, Dean, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Magruder, Colson, and others in the Watergate matter. Kleindienst has testified that the President appeared dumbfounded and upset when told of the Watergate involvement of Administration officials. The President did not tell Kleindienst that he had previously been given this information by Dean. (Summary of Information, 132) Later that afternoon, the President met with Petersen who further reported on the information the prosecutors had received from Dean and Magruder. Petersen has testified that at neither this meeting nor at subsequent meetings did the President disclose to him the information that Dean had discussed with the President on March 21, 1973. (Summary of Information, 133)

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- (3) Approving, condoning, acquiescing in, and counseling witnesses with respect to the giving of false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States and false or misleading testimony in duly instituted judicial and congressional proceedings;
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1. In August and September of 1972 John Mitchell and John Dean assisted Jeb Magruder in preparing false grand jury testimony.

(Summary, 45-56) On September 15, 1972 the President told Dean he had been skillful in putting his fingers in the dike when leaks have sprung here and there and instructed Dean to continue to "try to button it up as well as you can." (Summary 53,56) On March 21, 1973 the President told Dean that prior to the election Dean had handled it just right, that Dean had contained it. (Summary, 92)

2. On March 21, 1973 the President instructed Dean to falsely state that payments to the defendants had been made through a Cuban Committee. (Summary, 72)

3. On April 14, 1973 the President instructed Ehrlichman to have Dean prepare a plan on how to handle obstruction of justice allegations. (Summary 131)

4. On April 17, 1973 the President instructed Ehrlichman to give false testimony concerning knowledge of the purpose of the payments to the Watergate defendants. (Summary, 121-22)

5. On June 4, 1973 the President said that Alderman would handle the March 21 conversation with Dean in testimony before the SSC.

After Haldeman gave false testimony before the SSC concerning the substance of that conversation, the President publicly stated that Haldeman had stated the facts accurately. (Summary 166-67 , Book IX, 117-78, 436-42, 477, 960)

(4) Interfering or endeavoring to interfere with the conduct of investigations by the Department of Justice of the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force.

1. On June 21, 1972 Ehrlichman told Gray that Dean would be handling an inquiry into Watergate for the White House. On that same day Dean told Gray that he would sit in on FBI interviews of White House personnel. Throughout the period of June 21, 1972 to July 6, 1972 Dean was in contact with FBI officials. Dean conveyed the information told him by Gray to Ehrlichman. (HJC Summary of Information, pp. 33-34)

2. On June 28, 1972 Ehrlichman instructed Gray to cancel a meeting he had scheduled for later that day with Helms and Walters. Ehrlichman told Gray that the meeting was not necessary. The meeting had been arranged to resolve the question of CIA interest, if any, in the FBI's Watergate investigation. From June 23 to July 6 the FBI refrained from interviewing Manuel Ogarrion and Kenneth Dahlberg on the grounds that the CIA might have an interest in these persons. (HJC Summary of Information, p. 36; Book II, 450-55)

3. During the summer of 1972 Dean obtained from Gray raw data on the FBI's Watergate investigation. Dean has testified that he showed these reports to the attorneys for CRP and to CRP officials. Previously, Dean had asked Attorney General Kleindienst for access to FBI interview reports and Kleindienst had refused his request. This

information was used to impede the FBI's investigation. (Book II, 555-60)

4. In early August 1972 the President asked Ehrlichman to arrange for Stans not to be compelled to give testimony before the Grand Jury. After Ehrlichman spoke with Petersen and Kleindienst arrangements were made for Stans to give a deposition to the prosecutors rather than the Grand Jury. Similar arrangements were made by Dean to have Colson, Krogh, Young, Chapin and Strachan to offer testimony before the prosecutors instead of the Grand Jury. (Summary of Information, p. 48; Book II, 562, 565; Dean, 3 SSC 953-54)

5. On April 17, 1973 the President was aware that Dean was attempting to provide the prosecutors with evidence to secure immunity from prosecution, and that Dean's testimony would implicate Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson and possibly the President himself in wrongful conduct in the Watergate matter. Between 2:46 and 3:49 p.m. on April 17, the President met with Petersen. The President told Petersen that any immunity grant to Dean would be interpreted as a deal by Petersen to conceal the fact that Petersen had provided Dean with Grand Jury information in 1972. Petersen told the President that he objected to the inclusion of a reference in the President's public statement opposing grants of immunity. On

April 19 the President told Haldeman and Ehrlichman's attorneys, Wilson and Strickler, that he had included in his April 17 public statement a provision opposing immunity because the prosecutors were at that point hung up on the question of giving immunity to Dean. At this meeting the President described Dean as a "loose cannon." (Summary of Information, pp. 147, 152-53)

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(5) Approving, condoning, and acquiescing in, the surreptitious payment of substantial sums of money for the purpose of obtaining the silence or influencing the testimony of witnesses, potential witnesses or individuals who participated in such illegal entry and other illegal activities.

1. Between June 26 and 28, 1972 after discussions with Mitchell, Ehrlichman and Haldeman, Dean met on three occasions with CIA Deputy Director Walters and suggested, among other things, that the CIA provide the bail and salaries of the persons arrested at Watergate. Walters rejected the requests. (Summary of Information, p. 58)

2. Prior to September 21, 1972 Kalmbach, with the approval of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, raised and had distributed clandestinely to Mr. and Mrs. Howard Hunt for the benefit of the Watergate defendants approximately \$200,000. (Summary of Information, p. 60-61)

3. In November 1972 Hunt told Colson that he was protecting the people really responsible, but that it was a two-way street and the cheapest commodity was money. A tape of this telephone call was played for Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean and Mitchell. (Summary of Information, p. 61-62)

4. In December 1972 and January 1973, Haldeman approved the transfer of a \$350,000 White House cash fund under his control to Fred LaRue to be used in making payments to defendants. (Summary of Information, p. 62)

5. Between September 21, 1972 and March 20, 1973, LaRue disbursed \$132,000 from the transferred White House fund to the Watergate defendants including \$100,000 to Hunt's attorney, William Bittman. (Summary of Information, p. 62)

6. On March 16, 1973 Hunt told Colson's law partner, Shapiro, that if certain financial commitments made to him were not kept the Republicans would lose the 1974 election, but if the commitments were met none of his men would blow. Shapiro reported this conversation to Colson. (Summary of Information, p. 62-63)

7. On or about March 16, 1973, Hunt told Paul O'Brien that he needed \$130,000 prior to his sentencing, that he had done "seamy things" for the White House and that if he were not paid, he would have to "review his options." O'Brien told Dean of Hunt's demand. Dean warned O'Brien that they were being involved in an obstruction of justice. On March 20, 1973 Dean discussed Hunt's demand with Ehrlichman, Krogh and Moore. (Summary of Information, p. 64)

8. On March 21, 1973 Dean told the President of Hunt's blackmail threat. The President indicated familiarity with the payment scheme, said that \$1 million could be raised, said Hunt's demand should be met to buy time, discussed the pros and cons of the payment and concluded the meeting by stating that they could not let things blow. (Summary of Information, pp. 65-72)

9. On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 the President was told that Mitchell and LaRue were in a position to do something about Hunt's demand. (Summary of Information, p. 72)

10. Late on the evening of March 21, 1973, LaRue, after talking to Mitchell, arranged for the delivery of \$75,000 in cash to Hunt's attorney. On March 22, 1973 Mitchell told Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean that Hunt was not "a problem any longer." (Summary of Information, p. 72)

11. On April 14, 1973 the President instructed Haldeman and Ehrlichman to agree on the story that the payments were made, not "to obstruct justice," but to pay the legal fees and family support of the defendants. In April, on several occasions, the President discussed the payments and motives with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean and Petersen. (Summary of Information, pp. 74-75, 140-42)

12. On April 25 and 26, 1973, Haldeman, at the President's direction, listened to the March 21 tape and reported the contents to the President. (Summary of Information, p. 76)

(6) Endeavoring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency, an agency of the United States

1. Prior to June 23, 1972 the FBI traced thirty-two \$100 bills found in a hotel room used by the persons arrested at the DNC to the Florida bank account of one of those arrested and identified this cash as the proceeds of four Mexican checks and one check drawn by Kenneth Dahlberg. These checks were campaign contributions to CRP that FCRP Treasurer Hugh Sloan had given to Gordon Liddy to cash.

(Summary of Information, pp 21, 35)

2. On June 23, 1972 the President instructed Haldeman and Ehrlichman to have Walters meet with Gray to request the FBI to curtail its Watergate investigation. Haldeman testified that he told Helms and Walters on June 23 that the FBI's investigation was leading to important people. Walters testified that Haldeman said that he should suggest to Gray that the FBI investigation not be pushed further. Ehrlichman testified that at the meeting with Helms and Walters the Mexican money and the Florida bank account were mentioned as the type of thing the President was evidently concerned about. On the afternoon of June 23, Walters met with Gray, as per the President's instruction, and told Gray that the FBI's Watergate investigation should not be pursued into Mexico and that the investigation should be tapered off with the five persons already in custody. (Summary of Information, pp. 35-36; Book II, pp. 357, 383-86, 392, 400-07)

3. On June 26, 1972 after having received an assurance from Ehrlichman that it was all right to discuss such matters, Walters met with Dean to discuss what Walters had previously discussed on June 23 with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. On June 27 and 28 Walters again met with Dean. At these meetings, Dean endeavored to have the CIA agree to provide bail and other financial assistance to the Watergate defendants. (Summary of Information, p. 53; Book II, pp. 132-42)

4. On July 6, 1972 Gray, after having been told by Walters of the White House's misuses of both CIA and FBI, told the President that persons on the White House staff were seeking to mortally wound him. The President, after a slight pause, told Gray to just continue his aggressive and thorough investigation. (Summary of Information, pp. 47, 48; Book II, pp. 526-29, 550-53)

5. In January of 1973, Dean called the Director of the CIA and suggested that the CIA request the Department of Justice to return to the CIA a package of materials that had been sent to the Department of Justice in connection with its Watergate investigation. Among the materials requested to be returned to the CIA were the photographs taken by Hunt and Liddy in 1971 of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. (Book II, pp. 673-80)

6. In January of 1973, former Deputy CIA Director Cushman rewrote, at the request of Ehrlichman, a memorandum, requested by the

Watergate prosecutors, concerning a 1971 White House request for CIA assistance to Hunt. The initial memorandum identified Ehrlichman as one of those persons who possibly requested CIA assistance. Ehrlichman was, in fact, the person who had requested the CIA assistance for Hunt. (Book II, pp. 659-72)

(7) Disseminating information received from officers of the Department of Justice of the United States to subjects of investigations conducted by lawfully authorized investigative officers and employees of the United States, for the purpose of aiding and assisting such subjects in their attempts to avoid criminal liability.

1. On April 15, 1973 the President's notes of his meeting with Kleindienst indicate that the prosecutors were investigating the delivery of documents from Hunt's safe to Gray on June 28, 1972. Following this meeting the President instructed Ehrlichman to call Gray to discuss these documents.

2. On April 16, the President told Petersen "your talking only to me" and promised to treat as confidential, without exception, the information Petersen provided him. When Petersen expressed reservation about information being disclosed to Moore, the President agreed not to. Petersen told the President about information that Dean had given to the prosecutors. Immediately following Petersen's departure, the President reported to Ehrlichman on this conversation including information about the evidence against Ehrlichman and his possible criminal liability. Ehrlichman thereafter discussed this information with potential witnesses in telephone conversations which he recorded.

3. On the evening of April 16, 1973, the President again spoke with Petersen and reaffirmed his promise not to pass on information from Petersen to anyone else. Petersen then recounted the developments of the day -- the Watergate investigation. On the following morning, April 17, 1973, the President relayed to Haldeman information he had received the previous night from Petersen relating to Dean's meeting with Liddy on June 19, 1972. The President also gave Haldeman two instructions which coincided with the developments the President had learned from Petersen. The President instructed Haldeman to meet with Ehrlichman to devise a strategy to deal with the question of the purpose of payments to the defendants, and to communicate to Kalmbach who was scheduled to be called before the Grand Jury, that LaRue was a "broken man" and had talked very freely. (Summary of Information, 141)

4. On April 17, the President met with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Ziegler and again relayed information relating to the Watergate investigation that he had received in the previous two days in confidence from Petersen, including the fact that the upcoming Grand Jury testimony of Strachan and Kalmbach would be critical to a determination of Haldeman's criminal liability. The President again encouraged Haldeman and Ehrlichman to deal with "what the line ought to be" on the raising of funds for the defendants. (Summary, 142)

5. On April 17 the President met again with Petersen, who reported on the latest developments in the Watergate investigation. Petersen told the President that Haldeman and Ehrlichman might be named as unindicted co-conspirators when Magruder was indicted. He also reported that Gray admitted receiving and destroying the Hunt files and that Dean's lawyers had threatened to try the Administration in Dean's defense. One minute after the end of his meeting with Petersen, the President met with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Ziegler and disclosed this information from Petersen to them. (Summary of Information, 146-47)

6. On April 25 and April 26, 1973, the President directed Haldeman to listen to the tape recording of March 21, 1973 and report to the President. By April 25, the President had been informed by Petersen that Haldeman was implicated in various aspects of the Watergate matter; that the question of the payments to the defendants was a critical area; and that Haldeman's involvement in this matter was being closely investigated. On April 25, 1973, the President provided Haldeman, a prime suspect in the investigation, with access to Presidential tape recordings whose existence he did not disclose to the prosecutors, in order to enable Haldeman to prepare a strategy for meeting whatever disclosures Dean might make to the prosecutors. (Summary, 155)

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(8) Making false or misleading public statements for the purpose of deceiving the people of the United States into believing that a thorough and complete investigation had been conducted with respect to allegations of misconduct on the part of personnel of the executive branch of the United States and personnel of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

1. On June 22, 1972 the President publicly adopted as his position and as factually accurate the previous statements of Mitchell and Ziegler that the White House had no involvement whatever in the Watergate break-in and that CRP had no legal, moral or ethical accountability for the break-in. (Summary of Information, pp. 32-33; 8 Presidential Documents 1078-79)

2. On August 20, 1972 the President publicly stated that at the President's direction Dean had conducted a complete investigation which indicated that no one in the White House staff or in the Administration was involved in Watergate and that CRP was also conducting an investigation of Watergate. (Summary of information, p. 9091; 3 Presidential Documents 1306-07)

3. On October 5, 1972 the President publicly stated that he "wanted every lead carried out [by the FBI] to the end because I wanted to be sure that no member of the White House staff and no man or woman in a position of major responsibility in the Committee for Re-election had anything to do with this kind of reprehensible activity." (8 Presidential Documents 1486, 1489)

4. On March 2, 1973 the President publicly stated that the investigation conducted by Dean had indicated "that no one on the White House Staff, at the time he conducted the investigation -- that was last July and August -- was involved in or had knowledge of the Watergate matter." (Summary of Information, pp. 90-93; 9 Presidential Documents 214, 219-20)

5. On April 30, 1973 the President publicly stated that on March 21, 1973 he personally assumed responsibility for coordinating new inquiries into the Watergate matter, personally ordered those conducting investigations to report the facts directly to the President and ordered all persons in government and at CRP to cooperate fully with the FBI, prosecutors and grand jury. (9 Presidential Documents 433-34)

6. On May 22, 1973 the President publicly stated (1) that he took no part in, nor was he aware of, efforts to cover-up Watergate; (2) that he never authorized or knew of offers of executive clemency to Watergate defendants; (3) that not until March 21, 1973 did he know of efforts to provide funds to Watergate defendants; (4) that he did not attempt, or authorize others to attempt, to implicate the CIA in Watergate; and (5) that he did not learn of the Fielding break-in until the time of his own investigation. (Summary of Information, p. 37, 9 Presidential Documents 693-96)

7. On August 15, 1973 the President publicly stated:
(1) That he was told on March 21, 1973 that the money raised for payments to Watergate defendants was for attorney fees and family

family support "not to procure silence"; (2) that he had maintained the position that clemency could not be considered for those involved in the break-in; (3) that he was not aware either of the cover-up or the existence of anything to cover-up until March 21; (4) that he arranged the meeting on March 22, 1973 among the President, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Dean to discuss methods to get the facts out; (5) that on March 23, 1973 he ordered Dean to write a "complete report on all he knew of the entire Watergate matter"; and (6) that on March 30, 1973 he assigned Ehrlichman to make an investigation, the results of which Ehrlichman reported to the President on April 14, 1973 and which the President directed Ehrlichman to report immediately to the Attorney General. (Summary of Information, p. 88, 94-97; 9 Presidential Documents 991-94)

8. On August 22, 1973, the President publicly stated:

(1) that in the summer of 1972 MacGregor conducted a thorough investigation in 1972 about the involvement of White House personnel;

(3) that on March 22 the President told Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Mitchell and Dean that "we must get this story out, get the truth out, whatever and whoever it is going to hurt" (4) that Haldeman's testimony before the Senate Select Committee about the March 21, 1973 meeting was accurate, and (5) that the President never turned over information about criminal wrongdoing to the prosecutors in March and April 1973 because he assumed in March that Dean told Patersen everything he told the President and implied that Ehrlichman did the same after March 30, 1973. (Summary of Information, p. 125-131, 9 Presidential Documents 1010-24)

9. On September 5, 1973 the President publicly stated that after Dean had been unable to complete his report at Camp David, he assigned John Ehrlichman to conduct an investigation which was done "in the most thorough way". (Summary of Information, p. 98, 9 Presidential Documents 1049, 1954-56)

10. On November 17, 1973 the President publicly stated that he never authorized the offer of executive clemency to anyone. (Summary of Information, p. 88; 9 Presidential Documents 1345-53)

(9) Endeavoring to cause prospective defendants, and individuals duly tried and convicted, to expect favorable treatment and consideration in return for their silence or false testimony, or rewarding individuals for their silence or false testimony.

1. In July 1972 the President discussed with Ehrlichman executive clemency for those involved in Watergate. This was more than two months before any indictments were returned in the Watergate case and six months in advance of trial. (Summary of Information, p. 48)

2. On December 31, 1972 Hunt wrote Colson complaining that he had been abandoned by his friends. On January 3 Colson, Ehrlichman and Dean discussed the need to reassure Hunt about the amount of time he would have to spend in jail. On January 3 and 4, 1973, Colson met with Bittman and stated he would do anything he could to mitigate Hunt's sentence. Thereafter the Colson spoke to the President about Hunt's plight. (Summary of Information, pp. 77-78)

3. On January 11, 1973 Hunt pleaded guilty. (Summary of Information, p. 79)

4. In January 1973 Magruder told Haldeman that he would commit perjury in the trial of United States v. Liddy. On February 19, 1973 Dean prepared a talking paper for a meeting between Haldeman and the President at which Haldeman would discuss

with the President an Administration job for Magruder. The paper said Magruder would be vulnerable to Sloan if nominated for a confirmable position. After meeting with the President, Haldeman offered Magruder the highest paying available position which did not require Senate confirmation: a \$36,000 year job in the Department of Commerce. Magruder retained the position for a month after Dean discussed with the President on March 21, 1973 that Magruder had committed perjury. (Summary of Information, p. 111-12)

5. After December 8, 1972 the President discussed commuting Hunt's sentence on the basis of Hunt's wife's death. (Summary of Information, p. 80)

6. On February 28, 1973 and March 21, 1973, the President discussed with Dean the expectations of the Watergate defendants with respect to clemency and the political infeasibility of granting such clemency. (Summary of Information, pp. 79-82)

7. On April 14, 1973 the President instructed Ehrlichman on how the assurances of clemency were to be handled. He stated it was sufficient to give assurances of the President's personal affection and gratitude. He directed that such assurances be given to Magruder, Mitchell and Dean. Ehrlichman carried out these instructions. (Summary of Information, pp. 82-85)